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Abstract: In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good
game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious
decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in
the control setup. As such, both groups of players incur sunk costs and enter the public good game
with different wealth levels. Our results indicate that the way these sunk costs have been accrued
matters especially for groups on the losing side of the contest: Given the same level of sunk costs,
contributions to the public good are lower for groups which failed to be successful in the preceding
between-group contest. Furthermore, this detrimental effect is more pronounced for individuals who
play a contest with deliberate contributions before.
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1. Introduction
In economics and in society in general, many situations are of a competitive kind. For example
in public tenders, (cellular telephone) license lotteries or struggles for resources, considerable funds
are spent to outperform a competitor. One of the most widely used models for (team) competition
is the contest game [1,2], where agents invest resources in order to influence the probability to win
a prize.
In the field, however, the factual rents derived from the prize at stake are often not fully defined ex
ante and depend on what the winning party makes of it. Ref. [3] presents a model for an endogenous
contest prize, in which players’ contributions determine both the probability of winning and the value
of the prize. By contributing to the contest, players create a positive externality to all other competitors
by increasing the prize at stake. At the same time, contributing generates negative externalities, as it
reduces other players’ probability to win. As economic application, consider a situation where R&D
efforts affect realised profits from having the best idea.
However, contributions to winning the contest often do not directly influence the variable
prize at stake. This is determined separately from the contest instead. Imagine a procurement
tender for a construction project involving two corporations—each consisting of several
subdivisions—running for the contest. After the decision on which one has been awarded with
the project, the subdivisions of the winning corporation can deliver input to construct the project of
which the benefits are shared equally within the winning corporation.
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A related example of this kind of contest is the recent competition between Boeing and Airbus
for a major deal with El Al Airlines.1 We depart from the standard conceptualisation of this market
situation as duopoly of unitary players towards a more complex (and probably more realistic) one.
As such, each competitor consists of different segments (for the aviation example e.g., production of
fuselage, wings, turbines) and eventual rents depend on success or failure in the competition and the
subsequent behaviour of each firm’s segments, under incomplete contracts. Our model also applies to
situations in which the group’s payoff depends on their relative performance within an organisation
(i.e., R&D units, independent profit centres).
There are two stages: First, on the corporation level, each group spends resources to secure
the project. In the second stage, subdivisions invest resources for a project, whose benefits
are shared equally within the firm. Both firms produce after the contest, but we assume that the
successful group managed to gain access to a more attractive project, delivering higher returns
on capital.2 Theoretically, contribution decisions to the group project—which constitutes a public
good—should be independent of the amount of money spent in the first stage, as it represents a sunk
cost. Literature suggests though, that agents’ decisions are in fact influenced by sunk costs [7].
More specifically, individuals seem to be more willing to invest into an ongoing project, if more money
has been spent on it before e.g., [7,8].
Subdivision managers in charge could as well be subject to the inverse effect, though. Contributing to
the tender could be perceived as the first stage of a reciprocal or gift exchanging process. As such,
having invested a lot of resources in the first stage could make individuals feel entitled to cut back for the
public good. Another argument for this behaviour would be inequity averse preferences (cf. [9]), as those
who contributed more to the first stage of the game are relatively poorer. So far, research on sunk cost has
mainly focussed on investment or consumption decisions. However, the dynamics of a public good game
with a prior investment decision are different, because social preferences (as for example, reciprocity)
have a bearing on decision making as well.
In this paper we present an experimental study to investigate the effect of a first-stage investment
on agents’ willingness to contribute to a public good. Furthermore, the experimental design allows to
disentangle the effect of unintentional exogenous sunk costs from sunk costs emanating from deliberate
investments into a between-group contest. Executing this study in a controlled laboratory setting
allows isolating aforementioned factors and to draw more robust conclusions.
The article is structured as follows: In the next section we discuss the conceptual background
of our study; then we explain the setup of the experiment in Section 3; in Section 4 we formulate
hypotheses; before presenting results in Section 5; Section 6 provides concluding comments and
suggestions for future research.
2. Background
This article draws from three different strands of literature:
1. Endogenous prize contests,
2. Public good games with entry option and
3. Sunk costs
In this section we review some of the relevant literature.3
1 See [4] or [5] in press.
2 Public procurement procedures for legal aid providers in the UK illustrate a related application: Legal firms enter a tendering
process for duty provider contracts. While this represents an attractive business for legal enterprises, there is a considerable
amount of firms operating without duty work. In 2015, around 200 firms won no contract and currently operate without
duty work [6] in press.
3 A potential additional group of related literature combines exogenous-prize contests with public goods games, where players
simultaneously play in both games [10,11].
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2.1. Endogenous Prize Contests
An important component of contests is the prize at stake (cf. [12,13]). Not only does it represent
the motivational cue for engaging in a contest from a behavioural perspective, but it also determines
the equilibrium prediction in pure strategies (cf. [13,14]). In the field, there exists several contest
situations with an exogenous prize, like a money prize in sports tournaments or known rents from
patents in R&D races. However, often the contestants themselves can influence the prize to take away
from a successful competition. So far research on endogenous contest prizes has focused on scenarios
where the prize is influenced by players’ contribution to the contest [3,15] or by the price demanded in
a Bertrand competition game [4,16].
In [17], participants were able to make a real-time decision on entering a contest, while observing
the number of co-players currently in the market. They find a substantial excess entry into the market,
as compared to the risk neutral benchmark prediction. This was especially the case when the outside
option underlay a stochastic risk. The symmetric equilibrium investment level in the subsequent
contest negatively depends on the number of entrants into the market. While [17] join the ranks of
articles that find considerable overspending into the contest, they also observe a large fraction of
participants exhibiting a rather passive investment strategy after having decided to enter the contest.
Ref. [17] offer two explanations for the behaviour of this latter group:
1. Escape the outside option for treatments where it is risky.
2. Risk or loss averse individuals entering the market early, under the expectation that only few
other players would enter, refrain from placing a high bid upon observing that there were in fact
unexpectedly many entrants to the market.
Ref. [18] conduct an experiment where players auction for the right to participate in a coordination
game. The price for the right to play reduces strategic uncertainty and works as a tacit communication
device. While participants consistently fail to coordinate on a payoff-dominant equilibrium when
endowed with the right to play, those who went through a pre-play auction, achieve the efficient
outcome in the coordination game.
In the context of a weak link game, Ref. [19] compare a market mechanism with random sorting
with regards to players’ productivity. While there exists an efficiency gain from the market mechanism
for high performance workers, this effect is almost completely offset by a negative effect on players
with low performance pay.
We present an endogenous contest prize where the contributions for outperforming the competitor
do in fact not influence the size of the prize. Instead, these expenses are dedicated solely to the contest.
Public tenders, for example, are widely used for determining the granting of funds for projects or for
(public) facilities. Success or failure of the project depend on the winning party’s behaviour in the
post-contest phase.
2.2. Public Good Games with Entry Option
There exists an established theoretical literature on public goods games with entry option.
Refs. [20,21] argue that when individuals can opt between setting up a partnership with another player
or an outside option, entering conveys a message about the players’ types. This helps coordination
towards more efficient, cooperative strategies. Other authors refer to a false consensus bias as the
reason for the matching of types. If this is the case, cooperators are relatively more likely to enter the
cooperative game, as they tend to be more optimistic about the level of cooperation, than free riders
are [22].
Refs. [23,24] examine the effect of voluntary entry to a public goods game experimentally. Ref. [23]
find a positive effect on cooperation and efficiency in the presence of voluntary entry to a one-shot
public goods game. Ref. [24] compare the effectiveness of an entry option with an exit option in
a one-shot public goods game experiment. Although the possibility to exit increases the ability to
coordinate towards the cooperative strategy, the entry option does not deliver a significant effect.
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2.3. Sunk Costs
Classical examples of elicitation of sunk cost fallacies or escalating commitment, demonstrate cases
where agents are more willing to invest (additional) resources with higher previous investments [7,25].
One field study reported in [7], for example, demonstrates that individuals who paid the full price
for a theatre season ticket attend more performances than those who have randomly benefited from
a reduced price. Among the most prominent psychological explanations for the sunk cost fallacy is
prospect theory [26]: People do not update their reference point which makes them accept too much
risk. Ref. [27] offers a self-justification bias as alternative explanation: Individuals tend to invest more
resources into a losing asset in order to rationalise or justify their previous strategy.
One prominent aspect of our design is the fact that we can contrast sunk costs incurred
exogenously and those having been accrued deliberately by the player herself. So far, most existing
evidence on this topic is based on data where the sunk costs have either been exogenously defined by
the experimenter i.e., [25] or endogenously accrued by the player i.e., [28].
An example that considers this issue is presented by [29]. In an experimental study they examine
the effect of auctioning entry rights to a market on subsequent prices. In one treatment, agents do
not issue bids themselves, but entry rights are given randomly and the same cost as in the auctioning
treatment is induced exogenously. Most notably, prices do not differ between the auction and the
exogenous treatment. At the same time, the effect size of the sunk cost fallacy seems to depend on the
market situation. While there is a significant positive effect on average prices in an oligopolistic market,
they are unaffected in the monopoly treatment. Ref. [29] argue that while the entry fee encourages
players to risk engaging in a collusive strategy, this was—by design—much less of an issue in the
monopoly market because collusion is not possible by definition.
3. Setup
Before the main part of the experiment, we take a measure of individual social value orientation
(SVO), using techniques introduced by [30].4 We would expect players with a higher SVO score
(i.e., more prosocial types) to exhibit a greater willingness to contribute to the group project, as second
stage contribution is socially beneficial. Ref. [31] conduct a meta-analysis studying the effect of
SVO on cooperation in social dilemma games, employing 82 effect sizes from individual studies.
Overall, they find a “small to moderate (positive) relationship between SVO and cooperation
in social dilemmas”, with the underlying effect being most robust in public goods dilemmas.
Conceivable hypotheses concerning first stage expenditures are less obvious. An argument could be
made that more competitive types (i.e., those with a very low SVO score), spend more resources in
a competitive game like our between-group contest. Additionally, if more socially oriented participants
recognise the overall welfare reducing character of the between group contest, this should drive out
first stage expenditures from higher SVO score-types.
This study incorporates two experimental treatments: A competition treatment and an exogenous
treatment. While subjects in the former treatment compete for the right to play a public good game with
a relatively more attractive Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR), players in the latter treatment incur
an exogenous cost, before being sorted into an either high or low MPCR game. Details are described in
what follows.
[Competition treatment:] Players are sorted in groups of three and compete against another group
of the same size. This composition keeps unchanged and players’ identities are never associated with
their decisions. The game consists of two stages and it includes investment decisions as explained in
the following.
4 Details are described in Appendix A.
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First stage Each player receives an endowment of T = 200 tokens. For a price of 1 token per
ticket, they can purchase up to 100 tickets for the contest. Spendings of subject k in
group K and m in group M are labelled vk and vm, respectively. Tokens that are not
spent for the contest will be added to the player’s private account. With pK being
the probability for group K to win over group M, the contest success function (CSF)
similar to [1,2] is
pK
(
(vk)k∈K , (vm)m∈M
)
=

∑
k∈K
vk
∑
k∈K
vk+ ∑
m∈M
vm if maxi∈K∪M
{vi} > 0
1/2 otherwise
Second stage Players learn if their group has won or lost, other group’s first stage spending level,
the corresponding winning probability and their group mates’ wealth level T − vi.
Then, each group plays a public good game with wi being individual i’s investment
into the public good.5 For this, subjects can invest a maximum of 100 tokens.6
The winning group will enjoy a high MPCR of Hi = 0.8. The losing group will be
facing a low MPCR of Lo = 0.4.7 Individual payoff is then determined by:
pii (wi) =

200− vi − wi + 0.8 ∑i∈I wi Winning group
200− vi − wi + 0.4 ∑i∈I wi Losing group
[Exogenous treatment:] Players are sorted in groups of three and are connected with another group
of three, analogous to the competition treatment. Their first stage behaviour will be matched with a pair
of groups in the competition treatment. This means, for each pair of groups with voluntary first stage
spending, there will be a pair of groups in the exogenous treatment, that gets the same amount of tokens
deducted by the computer.8 Participants pass the following two stages:
First stage Each player receives an endowment of T = 200 tokens. Individual factors vi
are induced, matching another group’s behaviour in the competition treatment and
deducted from T.
Second stage Groups play a public good game. Players see the current wealth level of their group
mates (being T − vi) and the wealth level of the other group they are connected with.
Keeping in line with the matched groups from the competition treatment, the MPCR
will be Hi = 0.8 or Lo = 0.4. Individual payoff is determined by:
pii (wi) =

200− vi − wi + 0.8 ∑i∈I wi Winning group
200− vi − wi + 0.4 ∑i∈I wi Losing group
5 This was called team project in the instructions.
6 Each player receives 200 tokens in the beginning, of which she can spend 100 tokens for the contest and 100 tokens for
the subsequent public good game. We choose this setup with an overall endowment and two separate spending ceilings
to put emphasis on the overall wealth effects of the first stage decisions and the fact that the two stages are linked as one
game. Furthermore, there exist two separate ceilings, to keep constant the decision space across all players. So although
players frequently enter the second stage with different momentary wealth levels, there are no constraints for the individual
decision space emanating from the wealth levels.
7 1 > Hi > Lo > 1/3. The first and the last inequality define the public good game, in which subjects face a trade-off between
individual monetary interest and social efficiency. The second inequality makes sure that the winning group encounters
a more attractive game.
8 We have one pair of groups less in the exogenous treatment because of no-shows. Hence, there is in fact one pair of groups
from the competition treatment which is not mirrored in an exogenous treatment session.
Games 2018, 9, 41 6 of 28
Procedures
Using ORSEE by [32] we recruited 186 participants for the experiment, which was conducted
in the CeDEx lab at the University of Nottingham between May 2015 and March 2016. During this
computerised laboratory experiment,9 each participant sat in a cubicle, visually separated from each
other. Participants were randomly seated at one of 24 computers and found the instructions for
the SVO measure at their place. After the SVO measure was taken, instructions for the main part
were distributed. All instructions were read aloud both in order to enhance the understanding and to
make it credible to the participants that everyone shares the same information.10
The main part of the experiment started with a thorough trial period, including comprehension
questions, in order to make participants familiar with the interface and to ensure an accurate
understanding.11 After the main part, participants answered a short questionnaire about personal
attributes (i.e., age, gender) and preferences (political convictions, risk attitudes...).
The experiment took one hour, which included reading instructions, taking an SVO measure,
a trial period, the main part of the experiment, a questionnaire and payment. Average earnings
were £12.00, which was paid out privately and in cash at the end of the session.12
4. Hypotheses
First, we present predictions under standard assumptions in Section 4.1. Afterwards, we discuss
alternative hypotheses, first on group level in Section 4.2. Lastly, in Section 4.3 we turn to the individual
level, presenting the competing Hypotheses 4–6.
4.1. Standard Predictions
Under risk-neutrality and individualistic preferences, each player i in group K maximises her
expected earnings, which is
E (pii (vi, wk∈K)) = T − vi − wi + pK · Hi ∑
k∈K
wk + (1− pK) Lo ∑
k∈K
wk
As 1 > Hi > Lo > 1/3, investment into the public good is socially desirable but individually
costly for risk-neutral individualistic agents, who are only concerned with their own earnings.
The second-stage Nash equilibrium therefore is wi = 0 ∀ i ∈ K ∪ M, which renders both public
good games indifferent in expected values, i.e., zero. In the competition treatment, no resources will be
spent in the first stage, so vi = 0 ∀ i ∈ K ∪M. Find a more formal approach in Appendix B.
Hypothesis 1. Risk-neutral and individualistic players will contribute 0 in both stages of the game.
4.2. Behavioural Hypotheses—Group Behaviour
Next to the subgame perfect equilibrium as benchmark we formalise alternative hypotheses to
capture other regarding preferences.
Hypothesis 2. Winning groups will spend more for the team project than losing groups.
9 The software was programmed with “z-Tree” [33].
10 Find a copy of the instructions in Section 7.1.
11 As for the one shot character of the game and the complex nature of the setup, we want to be as certain as possible that
our participants understand the game. This is why we employ a trial round with randomly generated contributions and
understanding questions. Participants could only proceed when they have answered everything correctly (guessing as
strategy can be reasonably excluded). Screenshots will be provided in the supplementary material of this article.
12 About e 16.00 or $18.00 at the time of the experiment.
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Hypothesis 3. The difference in spending levels for the team project will be more pronounced for the
competition treatment.
More specifically, Equation (1) formalises these hypotheses concerning the relation between the
different mean contribution rates for each possible second stage outcome.
wi|win, comp > wi|win, ex > wi| lose, ex > wi| lose, comp (1)
wi| A, B represents average contribution levels given a particular group has won or lost (i.e.,
A ∈ {win, lose}, respectively) and given the group is in either the competition or the exogenous treatment
(i.e., B ∈ {comp, ex}, respectively).
The second inequality (between winning and losing groups) is in line with established empirical
results on public good games, that contributions increase with higher MPCR e.g., [34–36]. For the first
and the last inequality, we expect this tendency to be more pronounced for the competition treatment
because of sorting and signalling effects. Using first stage contribution, players can signal their
other-regarding preferences, i.e., players who spend resources to win in the first stage have more
cooperative dispositions.
Two alternatives would be:
1. Groups end up winning the contest because they have more competitive players, or
2. behavioural spillovers as in e.g., [37,38].
Using the SVO score we can test which explanation prevails. Under behavioural spillovers,
a player’s SVO would have no effect on first stage contribution.
4.3. Behavioural Hypotheses—Individual Behaviour
Applying a forward looking argumentation as in [39], the size of first stage contributions conveys
a signal about future play. To make an investment of e in the first stage of the competition treatment,
a player expects her profits in stage two to be at least e higher than without this prior investment.
This reduces strategic uncertainty, as players can eliminate from consideration the set of strategies,
that are payoff dominated in this sense. Ref. [39] offers an alternative argument for why first stage
contribution could trigger higher cooperation to the team project. In their theoretical model, “players
forecast how the game would be played if they formed coalitions and then they play according to
their most optimistic forecast” [39]. If first stage spending is interpreted as signal towards the level of
cooperativeness, this can make the “most optimistic forecast” more viable, increasing the likelihood of
it being played. This reasoning does not apply when players incur sunk costs randomly. First stage
sunk costs in the exogenous treatment do not convey a tacit signal about players’ types.
Hypothesis 4. Players who spend more in the team contest are also more cooperative in the public good game.
As discussed in Section 2.2, voluntary contribution to the first stage contest in our setup can
be interpreted as an implicit signal about whether or not an agent intends to engage in the second
stage public good game. Relating to the argument above, if cooperators are more optimistic about the
level of cooperation, they estimate higher expected profits from the second stage public good game.
Therefore we hypothesise that agents, exhibiting cooperative behaviour in the second stage, tend to
spend more resources in the contest.
From this we derive a hypothesis concerning the relationship of second stage (wi) and first stage
contribution (vi), formalised in Equation (2) below:
∆wi
∆vi
> 0 (2)
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Hypothesis 5. More wealthy players spend more to the public good game.
Hypothesis 6. This effect is more pronounced in the competition treatment.
By the nature of this game’s structure, participants might very well enter the public goods game
with different wealth levels. Agents that have spent more resources in the contest are relatively poor
and vice versa. At the same time, contributions to the second stage public good are restricted to
100 tokens, irrespective of players’ first stage behaviour. Ref. [40] study the emergence of contribution
norms in a public good game with heterogeneous agents. Without punishment opportunities, there is
no significant difference in contribution to the public good between agents with different money
endowment. This is the case despite (uninvolved) individuals’ stated normative preferences “that high
types should contribute more”.13
If players are indeed motivated by inequality concerns in the sense of [9,44], more wealthy
agents—those with lower first stage spendings—would contribute relatively more in the second
stage. Accordingly, Hypothesis 5 is antithetical to Hypothesis 4 and we would observe a negative
relationship between second stage contribution wi and first stage spending level of a player—i.e., the
opposite of Equation (2). Our setup allows to disentangle inequality concerns from actions motivated
by reciprocity. It is only in the competition treatment that first stage contributions are determined by
a conscious decision from the respective player. Accordingly, the relationship between first stage
contribution and second stage spending would only exist in the competition treatment if contributions
to the team project are motivated by reciprocity.
5. Results
This section consists of three parts. First (Section 5.1) we describe the contest spending behaviour
in the competition treatment. We analyse, which individual factors determine the willingness to
spend resources to the between group contest. In the second part (Section 5.2) we study how much
participants contribute to the team project and discuss structural differences comparing winning and
losing groups for the two treatments. Afterwards, we investigate the relationship of first and second
stage contribution (Sections 5.3 and 5.4).
As this is a one-shot game, individual data can be tested as independent observations.
For hypothesis testing, we use non-parametric methods, as the data is not normally distributed
(Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. N = 186, P = 0.00. Same result for first stage and second stage
contribution.): Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon test) for paired data [45] and Mann-Whitney
U test (MWU) for independent sample data [46]. We test for trends using Spearman’s rank
correlation (Spearman test) [47,48]. For regression analyses we employ a Tobit model with limits
at 0 and 100, as this is where the action space is limited.14 All regressions (both Tobit and OLS)
concerning second-stage behaviour apply standard errors that allow for intragroup correlation (as in,
chapter 8) [49,50].
5.1. Team Contest
Participants spend on average about 29 points on first stage tickets, which is substantially higher
than the benchmark prediction of zero contribution.15 Figure 1 depicts the distribution of team contest
contributions, indicating 0 as the modal contribution level. See Appendix C for a discussion of the role
of beliefs for contest expenditures in this game.
13 Generally, there exists mixed evidence in the literature on unequal wealth or unequal endowment in public goods games
see e.g., [41–43].
14 As reference, we also present results for ordinary least squares (OLS) in Appendix D.
15 The analysis in this Subsection employs data from the competition treatment only.
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Figure 1. Contribution to the Team Contest.
We use Tobit regression with limits at 0 and 100, to analyse determinants of individual contribution
to the between group contest; results are summarised in Table 1.16 First of all, the individual
measure of social value orientation (SVO)17 has a positive effect on the first stage contribution
behaviour. This means that participants with a relatively more social orientation chip in with more
resources for the between-group contest. Furthermore, the self-reported risk tolerance measure (risk
parameter) has no explanatory power for how many lottery tickets are bought. In [2,14], by contrast,
equilibrium contributions diminish with higher levels of both constant absolute risk aversion and
constant relative risk aversion.
Further controls were generated by a post-experiment questionnaire. We discover a strong gender
effect, such that female participants purchase significantly more lottery tickets. The magnitude of this
factor is substantial, given that the entire decision space only ranges from vi ∈ [0, 100]. The strong
positive magnitude of this factor might come as somewhat surprisingly, given an established literature
on women’s lower level of competitiveness e.g., [51,52]. To our knowledge, this puzzling result is
not paralleled by other studies on (group) contest games. However, first stage contribution can be
interpreted as “a task that each member prefers that another member of the group undertakes” [53].
The authors find that in mixed groups, women volunteer twice as often as men to take over such tasks.
Players’ age is also positively related to first stage contributions. While the range of age
in our sample only spans from 18–32, studies in sports literature employing a broader sample,
indicate a negative relationship between age and competitiveness [54].
16 Outcomes stay qualitatively similar when using OLS (Appendix D). The model’s variance inflation factors (VIF’s) are within
the usual recommended boundaries, presenting no evidence for multicollinearity.
17 For details see Appendix A.
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Table 1. Determinants of stage 1 contribution. Tobit model with limits at 0 and 100.
Variables (1) (2)First Stage Contribute
Social value orientation (SVO) 0.708 ** 0.514 *(0.29) (0.27)
Risk parameter 3.518(2.35)
Female 21.332 ***(7.77)
Age 4.838 ***(1.74)
Number of siblings −1.966(3.15)
Smoking 2.763(15.35)
Politics important −2.552(4.19)
Trust in others 17.066 **(6.84)
Income Equality −5.259 **(2.09)
Hard work −1.242(1.93)
Constant 12.482 * −104.908 **(6.29) (43.37)
N 96 93
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.072
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. Study major dummies not listed.
Some of the control factors, such as number of siblings, smoking, politics important18 and hard work
have no descriptive power for first stage spending behaviour.
Another strong positive effect is displayed by trust in others,19 such that participants who express
a higher level of trust contribute more to the contest. In this sense, contest expenditures could be seen
as sacrifice for the group’s benefit, which can repay if a high level of cooperation will be realised in the
subsequent second stage.
The factor income equality displays a negative coefficient in Regression (2). Individuals stated
their proximity to which of the two following statements they feel closer on a scale from one to seven:
“We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.”—“Incomes should be made
more equal.” Accordingly, this factor aims at capturing individual preferences for either a steep or
flat income curve. There is some indication as to that more equality-oriented participants exert less
resources for the between group contest.
5.2. Second Stage Contribution
Table 2 lists average contributions for both treatments and winning and losing groups.
Consider Figure 2 for an overview of individual contributions to the team project. Across all
treatments and first stage outcomes, players invest on average about 27 points into the team project.
Also notice that for the exogenous and the competition treatment, both average contribution levels
are virtually identical overall. In Hypotheses 2 and 3 alongside Equation (1) we formulate three
18 Politics important, for example has been generated through the questionnaire using a Likert scale from 1–4, where participants
were asked how important they find politics in their life.
19 For this term, participants answer the following question from the World Values Survey [55]: “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” They pick one of the
following two answers: “Need to be very careful”. or “Most people can be trusted”.
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inequalities, reflecting differences in sorting and MPCR. As for the second inequality of our hypothesis,
we observe a stark difference between average contribution levels comparing winning and losing teams,
respectively (Wilcoxon test on team level: N = 62, P = 0.001. Higher rank sum than expected for winning
teams). Members of the winning teams spend about twice as much on the team project, as compared
to players in the losing teams. This is true for both the competition and the exogenous treatments.
Table 2. Average individual contribution.
Win Lose Overall
Exogenous 34.3 19.5 26.9
Competition 37.2 16.3 26.8
Overall 35.8 17.8 26.8
0
10
20
30
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 20 40 60 80 100
Second stage contribution
Winning teams
0
10
20
30
0 20 40 60 80 100
Second stage contribution
Losing teams
Exogenous Competition
Figure 2. Individual contribution to the team project.
The third inequality in our hypothesis postulates that players in a losing group in the competition
treatment contribute less to the team project than a member of a losing group in the exogenous treatment.
Although the average second stage contributions point in the right direction (19.5 for exogenous and
16.3 for competition treatment), non-parametric tests on the group level fail to back this hypothesis
(Wilcoxon test on team level: N = 31, P = 0.566). At the same time, for losing groups complete free riding
occurs much more frequently in the competition treatment (28 times) than in the exogenous treatment
(19 times).
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The results concerning the first inequality of Equation (1) pan out similarly: The underlying
hypothesis states that individuals in a winning team contribute more in the competition treatment,
as compared to winning teams in the exogenous treatment. While the average second stage
contributions slightly tend towards this direction (34.3 for exogenous and 37.2 for competition treatment),
this indifference is far from being significant (Wilcoxon test on team level: N = 31, P = 0.566).
Hence, participants seem to not perceive contributions to the contest as a strong signal for second-stage
cooperativeness in the winning groups.
5.3. Relation between First and Second Stage Contribution
Based on the argument that first stage contribution is used as costly device to signal the willingness
to cooperate in the team project, we formulate Hypothesis 4 (Section 2.3 adds to this, applying a sunk
costs argumentation), which postulates a positive relationship between individual contest expenditures
and the subsequent investment into the team project. Concurrently, we discuss an antithetic perspective
on this matter by devising Hypothesis 5. Here, both inequality aversion and reciprocity actually
warrant a negative relationship between first and second stage contribution. Our setup allows us to
analyse which of the above arguments prevail.
In Table 3 we present results for a Tobit model with limits at 0 and 100 with robust standard
errors for intra-group correlation.20 We regress contributions to the team project on first stage expenses
and various other factors, as discussed below.21 Overall results for Regressions (3) through (6)
deliver evidence to support Hypothesis 4, displaying a positive interrelation between the two factors.
This means that players who tend to spend more in the contest phase of the game, are also those who
chip in relatively more resources to the subsequent team project.
Group Contribute Minus Self controls for the amount of lottery tickets of a player’s group mates.
Here also a positive relationship prevails between first stage contribution of the others in a group and
second the player’s contribution to the team project.
The degree of social value orientation (SVO) positively influences the willingness to cooperate in
the team project. This seems in line with the argument that one would expect more socially oriented
individuals to invest more into the group account.22
In all Regressions (3) through (6), we include a dummy variable for each of the four situations
a participant could end up in (outcome dummy henceforth):
Exogenous lose Player in the exogenous treatment in a group that lost in the first stage.
Exogenous win Player in the exogenous treatment in a group that won in the first stage.
Competition lose Player in the competition treatment in a group that lost in the first stage. This is
the default in regressions (3) through (2).
Competition win Player in the competition treatment in a group that won in the first stage.
20 In Appendix D we present results for equivalent OLS regressions with robust standard errors for intra-group correlation.
Results stay qualitatively the same.
21 We discuss the underlying control variables of Regressions (4) and (6) in an explorative analysis in Appendix E.
22 While the results of Regressions (1) and (2) might suggest a potential multicollinearity problem, this should only increase
the standard errors of the coefficients if they are collinear and have no influence on the actual coefficients. The models’
variance inflation factors (VIF’s), however, reject the possibility of a potential multicollinearity problem.
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Table 3. Determinants of second stage contribution. Tobit model with limits at 0 and 100.
Variables (3) (4) (5) (6)Second Stage Contribute
First stage 0.481 *** 0.360 ** 0.950 *** 0.912 **
Contribute (0.16) (0.17) (0.35) (0.37)
Group Contribute 0.253 ** 0.223 * 0.317 *** 0.262 **
Minus Self (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Social value 0.986 *** 0.809 ** 0.850 ** 0.721 **
orientation (SVO) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Exogenous lose 14.629 16.488 53.308 *** 49.942 **
(11.35) (11.51) (16.92) (19.30)
Exogenous win 24.567 * 25.530 ** 39.158 ** 44.400 **
(12.74) (12.02) (15.79) (17.82)
Competition win 31.763 *** 28.767 ** 27.690 32.699
(11.00) (12.50) (17.98) (20.46)
Exogenous lose −1.645 *** −1.419 **
× First stage Contr. (0.50) (0.56)
Exogenous win −0.578 −0.720
× First stage Contr. (0.40) (0.44)
Competition win −0.044 −0.282
× First stage Contr. (0.44) (0.50)
Constant −51.175 *** −127.493 ** −63.599 *** −130.816 **
(12.60) (50.81) (16.16) (53.69)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 186 181 186 181
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.067 0.045 0.073
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Study major
dummies not listed.
In Regressions (5) and (6) we additionally interact the outcome term with First stage Contribute,
which captures eventual heterogeneities between the outcomes in terms of first stage spending
levels. In consonance with the hypothesis tests above, both Exogenous win and Competition win
are significantly positive for almost all regressions, confirming that winning in the first stage leads
to higher contributions to the team project. When controlling for heterogeneities in lottery tickets
between outcomes in Regressions (5) and (6), the dummy for Exogenous lose is even significantly higher
than the default, which is Competition lose. This last finding is particularly interesting in the light of the
third inequality of Equation (1). When allowing for a heterogeneous effect of first stage spending on
contributions to the team project, differences between these two outcomes can be identified.
While overall there exists a positive relationship between first and second stage contribution,
the interaction effect in Regressions (5) and (6) identifies this to be significantly lower in the exogenous
treatment. Indeed, using a Tobit model with limits at 0 and 100 and robust standard errors for
intra-group correlation, we find no relationship between first and second stage contribution in exogenous
win and even some evidence for a negative relationship in exogenous lose.23 We will investigate this
matter more closely in the next subsection. The results in this subsection establish that in the competition
treatment, players’ second stage behaviour is not consistent with inequality aversion or reciprocity;
instead first stage spending is used as costly signalling device for the following team project phase.
Furthermore, participants are only prone to a sunk cost fallacy under deliberate sunk costs, not if these
have been incurred exogenously.
23 See Table A4 in Appendix D.
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Furthermore, in Regressions (3) and (4) the intercept for Competition win is significantly higher
than its counterpart from the losing situation, while the two slopes are about the same. This is some
evidence that in the competition treatment, losing the between group contest pans out as constant drag
on a group’s cooperation level towards the team project. This is also reflected in the number of zero
contributions, which is more than twice of what we observe at winning groups in this treatment.
Figure 3 adds to the observation that there exists a somewhat heterogeneous relationship between
treatments and winning and losing groups, respectively. The graph depicts the relationship between
individual lottery tickets purchased (stage 1 contribution) and input into the team project. It appears
that for both winning and losing teams in the competition treatment, it is the players who contributed
more to the between group contest before, who also chip in for the team project subsequently.
For the exogenous treatment this seems considerably less clear cut. This conjecture is confirmed by
the results of a Spearman test, where for the competition treatment, both individuals from winning
(Spearman test: N = 48, Spearman’s rho = 0.415, P = 0.003) and losing teams (Spearman test: N = 48,
Spearman’s rho = 0.429, P = 0.002) display a significant positive correlation between stage 1 and stage
2 contributions. For the exogenous treatment, neither individuals from the winning (Spearman test:
N = 48, Spearman’s rho = 0.100, P = 0.512) nor the losing teams (Spearman test: N = 48, Spearman’s
rho = −0.186, P = 0.222) display a significant correlation in this regard.
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Figure 3. Contribution to the team project in relation to individual lottery tickets purchased.
Figure 4 depicts jittered scatter plots for each of the four situations, as outlined above. It captures
the heterogeneous effect of first stage contribution on players’ willingness to cooperate in the team
project. The solid line represents the fitted values determined by Tobit regression, with clustered
standard error at the group level and boundaries at 0 and 100. For the losing teams, the treatment
difference in the relationship between lottery tickets and contribution to the team project becomes
apparent. While it is a sharply increasing function for the competition treatment, it has a negative slope
in the exogenous treatment.
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Figure 4. Relationship between first stage and second stage contribution and fitted regression line.
5.4. Regression to the Mean
In Section 1 we argue that participants who find themselves in the position of the group’s
“workhorse”—by having purchased more lottery tickets than their teammates—could cut back on
second stage contribution because of a feeling of entitlement of the sort “I brought us here, now you pay
me off”. Figure 5 illustrates this regression to the mean effect in a jittered scatter plot with individual
first stage contribution relative to the average of the other team members on the x-axis and the
difference between individual first and second stage contribution on the y-axis. The solid line represents
the fitted OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the group level. Indeed, participants who
contribute more relative to their other group members in the first stage, tend to reduce their spending
level in the second stage, which is indicated by the fitted line’s negative slope (OLS regression with
clustered standard errors. N = 186, Coef. = −0.549, P = 0.000).
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Figure 5. Regression to the mean effect.
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This result relates to our findings discussed above insofar as that the positive relationship between
first and second stage contribution prevails from a general perspective. Yet overall spread between
contributors and defectors gets weakened.
6. Discussion
In this article we present an experimental study in which we analyse how individuals react to
heterogeneous sunk costs in a public good games setting. Specifically, we investigate two types of sunk
costs: Deliberately accrued expenses and exogenously imposed deductions. We argue that although
they are economically equivalent, players will not derive the same consequences.
Players in the competition treatment spend resources to influence the probability for getting their
group sorted into a public good game with a higher MPCR. Players in the exogenous treatment, on the
other hand, do not make this decision themselves. Instead there is a one-on-one matching with the
contest from the competition treatment.
Standard Nash equilibrium under risk-neutrality and individualistic preferences would predict
zero contribution to both stages of the experiment. By contrast, most players spend positive amounts
in both games, dismissing Hypothesis 1. In Hypotheses 2 and 3, as well as Equation (1) we specify our
hypothesis concerning the average contribution levels for the four different scenarios. While our data
clearly indicates a higher contribution level for those groups that have been sorted to the higher MPCR
game, results for the other two inequalities are considerably less clear cut. Only when controlling for
outcome-specific level effects, we find some evidence that losing groups in the exogenous treatment
spend more than their counterpart from the competition treatment. In our tests for Hypotheses 4 and 5 we
examine the interrelation of first and second stage contribution. Our results corroborate Hypothesis 4
at the expense of its counter-hypotheses 5 and 6. The positive relationship between first and second
stage contribution mainly prevails in the competition treatment, where it is utilised as costly signalling
and sacrifice.
Furthermore, players in the competition treatment have a slightly higher tendency to refrain from
contributing to the public good, when their team has lost. An equivalent higher contribution level for
winning groups in the competition treatment, however, cannot be observed.
This means that players in the underlying game do not perceive a positive outcome of the
between-group contest as signal for their group-mates’ willingness to cooperate, as compared to when
they reach the high MPCR by exogenous sorting. At the same time, participants display a reduced
willingness to cooperate with their teammates, when the group failed to attain the high MPCR game
in the contest, as compared to the exogenous sorting.
Coming back to the aforementioned case of between company competition for a business
deal, the implications derived from our results, vindicate a rather sceptical angle on a tendering
of commercial covenants. If both candidates dispose of comparable productivity levels, the harm
to the losing party is not met by an analogous positive burst of the winning party. From an overall
social welfare perspective, devising a method of arbitration which avoids a between group contest
would be favourable. To further test this policy advice, different ways of arbitration could be
examined: Make both parties pay in equal amounts, or have the winner pay for it completely, among
other conceivable sharing rules. The caveat of a subliminal latent contest might still apply in most
settings, however.
7. Materials and Methods
7.1. Instructions
The instructions consisted of two parts. When entering the computer laboratory, participants found
a printed copy of the first-part of instructions at their seat. They learned about the structure of
the experiment, the exchange rate between points and pound sterling, as well as the SVO measure.
The instructions were read aloud before participants started with the SVO slider task. After this,
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the second set of instructions was handed out, in which the main part of the experiment was explained.
These instructions were read aloud as well. Paragraphs starting with a treatment name in square
brackets were only given to participants of that particular treatment.
7.1.1. Instructions Part 1
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions
carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to
your cubicle to answer your question. Talking or using mobile phones or any other electronic devices
is strictly prohibited. Mobile phones and other electronic devices should be switched off. If you
are found violating these rules, you will both forfeit any earnings from this experiment, and may be
excluded from future experiments as well.
This is an experiment about decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them
carefully you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you privately and
in cash at the end of today’s session. The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions,
on other participants’ decisions and on random events. You will never be asked to reveal your identity
to anyone during the course of the experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your
decisions. To keep your decisions private, do not reveal your choices to any other participant.
During the experiment you will have the chance to earn points, which will be converted into cash
at the end of today’s session, using an exchange rate of
1 point = 5 pence.
Thus, the more points you earn, the more cash you will receive at the end of the session.
This experiment consists of two parts. The following instructions explain Part 1. After finishing
this part, you will receive further instructions for Part 2. None of your (or anyone else’s) decisions for
one part are relevant for your (or anyone else’s) performance in the other part.
Part 1: In this task you will be randomly paired with another person in this room. You will make
a series of decisions about allocating points between you and the other person.
Then one of you will be assigned the role of Sender and the other one the role of Receiver. If you
are the Sender, ONE of your decisions will be picked randomly and implemented for both of you
(i.e., you receive what you allocated to yourself and the other person receives what you allocated
to her).
If you are assigned the role of Receiver, ONE decision of the other person will be picked randomly
and implemented for both of you (i.e., you receive what the other person allocated to you and the
other person receives what she allocated to herself).
All of your choices are completely confidential. You will learn your results of Part 1 after Part 2
has finished. Points earned in Part 1 and Part 2 will be added up to determine your total earnings.
7.1.2. Instructions Part 2
In Part 2, all participants are assigned to teams of three and your team will be matched with
another team. None of you will learn the identities of own team members or other team members.
Part 2 will consist of two stages:
[Competition treatment:] At the beginning of the first stage you will receive 200 points. Then you
can use up to 100 of your points to buy lottery tickets for your team. Each lottery ticket costs 1 point.
Any of your points not spent on lottery tickets will be accumulated in your private point balance.
Likewise, each of your team members receives 200 points and can use up to 100 of these points to buy
lottery tickets for your team. Similarly, each member of the other team will receive 200 points and can
buy tickets for their team in exactly the same way.
[Exogenous treatment:] At the beginning of the first stage you will receive 200 points. Then the
computer can use up to 100 of your points to buy lottery tickets for your team. Each lottery ticket
costs 1 point. Any of your points not spent on lottery tickets will be accumulated in your private point
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balance. Likewise, each of your team members receives 200 points and the computer can use up to
100 of these points to buy lottery tickets for your team. Similarly, each member of the other team will
receive 200 points and the computer can buy tickets for their team in exactly the same way.
Next, a lottery will determine whether your team, or the team you are matched with wins.
One of the tickets is randomly selected to be the winning ticket. Each ticket has the same chance.
Hence, the more tickets your team has, the higher is your team’s chance of winning.
Examples: If your team and the other team have the same amount of tickets then each team is
equally likely to win. If your team has three times as many tickets as the other team, then your team is
three times as likely to win as the other team. If only one of the teams has tickets, then this team wins
with certainty. If neither your team nor the other team has any tickets, then one of the teams will be
randomly selected as the winner with each team equally likely to be selected.
After the winning team is determined you will reach the second stage. You will be able to see the
following information: Individual tickets for each of your team mates, other team’s tickets and your
winning probability. The second stage differs between the winning and the losing team in one way,
which will be underlined below.
In the second stage you can invest up to 100 points of your endowment in a team project. Any point
you do not invest and keep to yourself will be accumulated in your private point balance. Each point
invested in the team project yields 0.8 points for you and every member of your team, if your team has
won in the first stage. Similarly, each point invested in the team project yields 0.4 points for you and
every member of your team if your team has lost in the first stage. Likewise, your team members can
invest in the team project in the same way.
A summary of how your Part 2 earnings will be determined is provided on the next page.
This part starts with a trial period in which you will be asked to answer some questions in
order to check your understanding and to give you the opportunity to get acquainted with the setup.
Points earned in this trial period will not be paid off.
Summary:
Your earnings for this part are determined as follows:
Winning team:
Your Endowment (= 200)
− Your tickets (between 0 and 100)
− Your contribution to the team project (between 0 and 100)
+ 0.8 × your team’s total contribution to the team project
= Your earnings
Losing team:
Your Endowment (= 200)
− Your tickets (between 0 and 100)
− Your contribution to the team project (between 0 and 100)
+ 0.4 × your team’s total contribution to the team project
= Your earnings
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Appendix A. Social Value Orientation-Measure
Prior to the main part of the experiment, we take a measurement of individual social preferences,
using the SVO slider measure by [30].24 Participants set six sliders to determine mutual sharing of an
amount of tokens, as represented in Figure A1. This was incentivised in the following way: After all
participants cast their decisions, pairs of two were randomly created with one being the Sender and
the other participant being the Receiver. One of the Sender’s decisions was implemented on both at
random, where the Sender gets what she allocated to herself and the Receiver gets what the Sender
allocated to her. Participants only got to know, which allocation was chosen to be paid out, after the
main part of the experiment.
This technique was a simplification and adjustment of the circle test employed by [57,58]. It has
demonstrated reliable psychometric properties, yields scores for individuals at the ratio level and is
quick and easy to implement cf. [59].
Figure A1. Slider questions to measure Social Value Orientation as seen by participants.
24 [56] provide a helpful tool for implementation.
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Appendix B. Risk Neutral Equilibrium
Second stage Players individually maximise their profit pii by setting own contribution wi:
pii (wi) = T2− wi + MPCR ·∑
i∈I
wi (A1)
with MPCR ∈ Hi ∪ Lo. As pi′i < 0 and pi′′i = 0, there exists a corner solution wi = 0.
First stage Under common knowledge of rationality, players know that wi = 0 and maximise
pii (vi) = T1−
vi + ∑
k 6=i
k∈K
vK
vi + ∑
k 6=i
k∈K
vK + ∑
m∈M
vM
· z− vi (A2)
with z = 0 being the expected earnings from stage 2. Again, a corner solution exists
with vi = 0.
Appendix C. Contest Expenditures—The Role of Beliefs
About 10% of first stage contributions fall in an area which is not rationalisable
(i.e., contributions larger than 65), even holding the most optimistic beliefs about the second stage
(i.e., all other players contribute fully), while at the same time holding very pessimistic beliefs about
groupmates’ behaviour in the first stage (i.e., no other groupmate buys lottery tickets). When holding
the same beliefs on second stage contributions, while assuming symmetry in first stage spending levels,
some 46% fall in the category of non-rationalisability (contributions larger than 603 = 21.6¯).
Second stage Player i’s payoff depends positively on her teammates’ input towards the team project
wk∈K\{i}, as in:
∂pii
∂wk∈K\{i}
> 0 (A3)
Hence, player i’s most optimistic belief for the second stage would involve full
contribution by all other group members, i.e., wk∈K\{i} = 100 ∀ k ∈ K, which would
amount to an account of ∑k∈K wk = 200 and expected second stage earnings of
z = T2+ Hi ·∑k∈K wk = 260 for a winning group.
First stage Most pessimistic beliefs about teammates’ contest spending behaviour are characterised
as vk∈K\{i} = 0 ∀ k, i ∈ K. If all teammates do not buy lottery tickets (∑k∈K\{i} = 0)
and expected second stage payoff z = 260, player i maximises Equation (A2) at
vi = z4 = 65.
Consider as alternative belief on first stage behaviour, that all teammates contribute
symmetrically, i.e., ∑k∈K vk = 3 · vk ∀ k ∈ K. For this set of beliefs, Equation (A2)
maximises at vi = z12 = 21.6¯.
Appendix D. Additional Regressions
Table A1 shows results for OLS regressions of determinants of individual contribution to the
between group contest akin to Table 1. Results stay qualitatively similar and the interpretation
corresponds with Section 5.1.
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Table A1. Determinants of stage 1 contribution—OLS Regression.
Variables (7) (8)First Stage Contribute
Social value orientation (SVO) 0.529 ** 0.395 *(0.22) (0.22)
Risk parameter 2.708(2.03)
Female 15.299 **(6.55)
Age 3.567 **(1.49)
Number of siblings −1.632(2.76)
Smoking 3.882(12.64)
Politics important −3.164(3.65)
Trust in others 13.727 **(5.96)
Income Equality −3.067 *(1.78)
Hard work −1.119(1.69)
Constant 19.614 *** −73.035 *(4.62) (36.93)
N 96 93
R-squared 0.060 0.435
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. Study major dummies not listed.
Complementing Table 3, we present results for OLS regressions with robust standard errors for
intra-group correlation in Table A2. We analyse the relationship between contribution to the team
project and first stage contribution, including outcome dummies, interaction effects and controls.
Results stay fairly comparable overall, between the two regression methods.
As alternative, we analyse each of the four outcomes separately. For this, we regress contribution
to the team project on first stage contribution and a few controls using a Tobit model with robust
standard errors for intragroup correlation and limits at 0 and 100.25 Consider Table A3a,b with
losing/winning groups of the exogenous and losing/winning groups of the competition treatment,
each with and without control variables.
25 Results for corresponding models using OLS regression stay qualitatively identical.
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Table A2. Determinants of stage 2 contribution—OLS Regression.
Variables (9) (10) (11) (12)Second Stage Contribute
First stage 0.241 *** 0.210 ** 0.269 * 0.336 *
Contribute (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.19)
Group Contribute 0.108 * 0.093 0.149 ** 0.117
Minus Self (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Social value 0.435 ** 0.327 * 0.355 * 0.284
orientation (SVO) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Exogenous lose 2.557 5.381 17.171 ** 18.633 *
(5.26) (6.09) (7.57) (10.52)
Exogenous win 12.196 * 12.697 * 12.421 * 16.964 *
(6.58) (6.40) (6.68) (8.50)
Competition win 15.012 *** 13.994 ** 5.377 9.693
(5.37) (6.73) (8.31) (10.72)
Exogenous lose −0.635 *** −0.577 *
× First stage Contr. (0.21) (0.30)
Exogenous win −0.039 −0.181
× First stage Contr. (0.18) (0.24)
Competition win 0.249 0.072
× First stage Contr. (0.21) (0.27)
Constant −1.255 −39.688 −2.461 −39.307
(4.85) (32.75) (5.41) (34.09)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 186 181 186 181
R-squared 0.166 0.310 0.221 0.336
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Study major
dummies not listed.
Table A3. Tobit models with limits at 0 and 100.
(a) Exogenous Treatment.
Variables
Contribution to the Team Project
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Exogenous Lose Exogenous Win
First stage −0.896 ** −0.559 0.205 0.504 *
Contribute (0.38) (0.36) (0.33) (0.25)
Group Contribute 0.142 0.076 0.570 *** 0.619 ***
Minus Self (0.24) (0.20) (0.18) (0.14)
Social value 0.062 0.025 −0.033 0.335
orientation (SVO) (0.45) (0.32) (0.51) (0.62)
Constant −35.603 14.801 −245.801 ** −41.283 **
(70.81) (14.87) (102.83) (20.20)
Controls Yes No Yes No
N 43 45 45 45
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.008 0.143 0.035
(b) Competition Treatment.
Variables
Contribution to the Team Project
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Competition Lose Competition Win
First stage −0.095 0.817 ** 0.080 0.664 **
Contribute (0.26) (0.35) (0.26) (0.31)
Group Contribute 0.509 *** 0.572 *** 0.003 −0.066
Minus Self (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23)
Social value 1.852 ** 1.646 ** 1.020 ** 1.671 *
orientation (SVO) (0.71) (0.73) (0.37) (0.91)
Constant 58.374 −85.612 *** −333.308 *** −15.653
(79.29) (23.42) (82.57) (25.38)
Controls Yes No Yes No
N 46 48 47 48
Pseudo R-squared 0.206 0.074 0.203 0.056
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Study major
dummies not listed.
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For the competition treatment there mostly exists a clear positive relationship between contribution
to the lottery game and to the team project. This means that relatively poorer individuals spend
more for the team project. This is not the case, however, for the exogenous treatment: Regression (13)
displays a significant negative coefficient, while Regression (16) has a significantly positive relationship.
The group contribution level plays a positive role as well in some regressions.
Social value orientation (SVO) only plays a role in the competition treatment in all regressions (17)–(20),
where it is positive. This relationship does not exist, though, for the exogenous treatment, where the
explanatory power of the SVO measure is not significantly different from zero.
Table A4. Tobit model with limits at 0 and 100 testing if first stage contribution has a significant effect
on second stage contribution.
Variables
Second stage Contribute
(5.1) (6.1) (5.2) (6.2)
Exogenous lose Exogenous win
First stage −0.512 −0.776∗ ∗ 0.345 −0.038
Contribute (0.32) (0.32) (0.24) (0.36)
Social value −0.018 0.116 0.141 −0.197
orientation (SVO) (0.34) (0.43) (0.75) (0.49)
Constant 18.011 −17.204 10.284 −213.785∗
(12.96) (63.02) (18.44) (106.81)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 45 43 45 45
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.137 0.005 0.117
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Study major dummies
not listed.
Appendix E. Control Variables
Table A5 corresponds to Regressions (4) and (6) of Table 3 and displays the control variables,
which were generated by a post-experiment questionnaire, in more detail. We do not have
well-established hypotheses for each of these control variables, for why we present this section
in an explorative character. In Table A6, which corresponds to Regressions (13), (15), (17) and (19)
of Table A3a,b, we investigate on heterogeneities of these control variables between outcomes in
the experiment.26
The risk parameter has explanatory power (all positive) only for some of the regressions in
this section. It was generated by a self-reported risk tolerance indication on a scale from one to
seven. As players invest resources without knowing the contribution level of other teammates,
contributing involves a certain degree of risk taking. Accordingly, it seems intuitively plausible that
individuals displaying a higher level of risk tolerance would also contribute more to the team project.
While being an overall noisy parameter, female seems to deliver some evidence that female
participants follow a more cooperative strategy towards the public good. Unlike our results for gender
effects in first stage contribution, this positive relationship seems in line with established literature
e.g., [60].27
26 We believe this approach delivers more lucid results here, than interaction terms would.
27 In a more recent study, Sell and Kuipers [61] examine the gender bias in cooperation levels in the context of a structural
social psychological framework. They argue that a large part of variation in gender specific willingness to cooperate can
be explained by structural differences and identities of institutional rules and norms. Sell and Kuipers [61] close with the
optimistic note that these stereotypical gender roles, which are often perceived as innate, can in fact be overcome and
ensuing social dilemmas be solved.
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Table A5. Determinants of stage 2 contribution. Tobit model with limits at 0 and 100—Control Variables.
Variables (4) (6)Second Stage Contribute
First stage 0.360 ** 0.912 **
Contribute (0.17) (0.37)
Group Contribute 0.223 * 0.262 **
Minus Self (0.12) (0.12)
Social value 0.809 ** 0.721 **
orientation (SVO) (0.34) (0.34)
Exogenous lose 16.488 49.942 **
(11.51) (19.30)
Exogenous win 25.530 ** 44.400 **
(12.02) (17.82)
Competition win 28.767 ** 32.699
(12.50) (20.46)
Risk parameter 7.270 * 6.264
(3.69) (3.94)
Female 10.767 8.824
(10.13) (9.35)
Age 3.484 * 2.890
(1.84) (1.84)
Number of siblings 4.185 4.356
(3.84) (3.87)
Smoking −12.913 −12.770
(20.72) (21.75)
Politics important −14.725 ** −14.478 **
(6.12) (6.19)
Trust in others 11.438 7.464
(7.79) (7.63)
Income Equality 2.121 2.914
(2.78) (2.91)
Hard work −5.231 ** −4.427 *
(2.47) (2.50)
Exogenous lose −1.419 **
× First stage Contr. (0.56)
Exogenous win −0.720
× First stage Contr. (0.44)
Competition win −0.282
× First stage Contr. (0.50)
Constant −127.493 ** −130.816 **
(50.81) (53.69)
N 181 181
Pseudo R-squared 0.067 0.073
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Study major dummies
not listed.
A factor that predominantly plays a role in the competition treatment is the age of participants.
Interestingly, age seems to accentuate the difference between winning and losing groups along the
lines of Hypothesis 1. By contrast, number of siblings slightly works in the opposite effect. Experimental
results from a trust game in Glaeser et al. [62] suggest that individuals with siblings are a lot more
trustworthy than only child individuals: the latter only returned about half as much money to the
senders as the former. In our study, this effect only persists in losing groups with a lower structural
contribution level. Therefore, number of siblings could represent a regression to the mean effect that
attenuates “extreme” levels of contribution.
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Table A6. Effect of first stage contribution and dummies on cooperation level in the team project.
Variables
Contribution to the Team Project
(13) (15) (17) (19)
Exogenous Lose Exogenous Win Competition Lose Competition Win
First stage −0.896 ** 0.205 −0.095 0.080
Contribute (0.38) (0.33) (0.26) (0.26)
Group Contribute 0.142 0.570 *** 0.509 *** 0.003
Minus Self (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
Social value 0.062 −0.033 1.852 ** 1.020 **
orientation (SVO) (0.45) (0.51) (0.71) (0.37)
Risk parameter −2.719 15.760 * −5.537 22.633 ***
(6.71) (7.66) (5.28) (6.85)
Female 24.237 ** 43.473 16.922 37.388 *
(11.42) (25.80) (15.72) (19.14)
Age 2.839 1.104 -2.599 12.741 ***
(2.58) (2.24) (3.64) (2.79)
Number of siblings 9.572 -3.455 21.426 *** −11.312 *
(7.53) (5.82) (7.34) (6.59)
Smoking −55.281 ** 39.069 -15.025 −148.254 ***
(20.34) (57.84) (32.35) (45.91)
Politics important −18.907 * −8.347 1.375 −10.476
(10.23) (11.49) (7.77) (7.65)
Trust in others 2.902 −13.040 23.770 *** 27.203 *
(12.70) (17.80) (6.93) (15.56)
Income Equality 10.225 *** 18.709 *** −7.284 * −19.230 ***
(3.37) (5.10) (3.68) (6.72)
Hard work −7.560 9.919 −7.221 ** −9.436 **
(4.70) (6.21) (3.07) (4.19)
Constant −35.603 −245.801 ** 58.374 −333.308 ***
(70.81) (102.83) (79.29) (82.57)
N 43 45 46 47
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.143 0.206 0.203
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Study major
dummies not listed.
In the questionnaire we asked participants whether they smoke or not and if they do so regularly
or only sometimes. We include this parameter as proxy for short-sightedness of utility horizons cp. [63].
Indeed, participants with a higher self-reported level of tobacco consumption, seem to contribute less
to the team project. This effect is only reflected in Regressions (13) and (19), though. In consonance
with the line of reasoning in Slovic [63], we construe that (frequent) smokers exhibit a shorter time
horizon for their decisions. Accordingly, they pick the bird in the hand—keep the 100 tokens to
themselves—over the two in the bush—potential gains from the group project.
Also for Politics important we can identify some evidence that this factor negatively influences
second stage spending in Regressions (4), (6) and (13). Politics important has been generated using a scale
from 1–4, where participants were asked how important they find politics in their life. If interpreting
this factor as akin to individual Public Service Motivation (PSM), its negative effect on players’ level of
cooperativeness seems rather unintuitive. Esteve et al. [64], for example show that individuals with
higher levels of PSM exert more effort for their communities and societies.
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In line with arguments from Section 5.1, we would expect participants with a higher Trust in
others28 to be more cooperative in the team project. Only two of the regressions confirm this hypothesis,
while this variable stays insignificant in the other regressions.
For the factor income equality, individuals stated their proximity to which of the two following
statements they feel closer on a scale from one to seven: “We need larger income differences as
incentives for individual effort.”—“Incomes should be made more equal.” Accordingly, this factor
aims at capturing individual preferences for either a steep or flat income curve. Results for income
equality identify opposite effects for the two treatments. While there seems to be a positive relationship
in the exogenous treatment, the parameter turns negative for regressions using players from the
competition treatment.
The last parameter, hard work intends to pick up a certain dog-eat-dog mentality as in whether
participants believe that everyone is the architect of ones own fortune or if success is a matter of
luck. On a scale from one to seven, participants express their proximity to one of the two statements:
“Hard work doesn’t generally bring success; it’s more a matter of luck and connections.”—“In the long
run, hard work usually brings a better life.” Those participants who rather believe that hard work pays
off—“man forges his own destiny”—are less willing to contribute to the group account in the team
project phase of the game. We find support for this hypothesis in most of the underlying regressions.
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